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INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY 
 
 
1  The Problem 
 
Modern global society has seen dramatic changes that throw us into impenetrable ethical problems 
of a kind never before witnessed in history.  By this means, ethical problems constitute the locus of 
our confrontation with our own life situation.  It is this condition that I take to be of fundamental 
importance when one undertakes to reflect upon the meaning of ethics today. 
 
If we approach the issue from the point of view of the history of ideas, we find that throughout the 
whole of the history of philosophy there have been a series of different attempts to articulate an 
ethics.  Most of them address our concerns about how a human being ought to act in order to realise 
his or her life in the best or most correct way.  I will return to the array of suggestions that have 
been offered in this regard.  What is important for my purposes, meanwhile, is that there is some-
thing that precedes ethical considerations, namely, the fact that ethics imposes itself upon the indi-
vidual as a vital problem, and as one that cannot be escaped. 
 
There is no shortage of examples in modern society.  If we could once avail ourselves of that figure 
of speech by which mind might conquer matter—that the lives we live might be transformed by the 
force of imagination—we are forced today to concede that the reality of modern social life is 
stranger than any fiction we might conceive.  Every day sees the production of another grotesque 
example of an ethical problem that had hitherto been unimaginable, but which has nonetheless been 
installed in the everyday life conditions of the individual human being.  Medicine is an area that is 
especially rich in such examples because the most advanced medical technologies confront us with 
wholly novel problems.  If we take an area that touches upon one of the most common aspects of 
the human condition, namely, our mortality, we can see that this, when understood as a biological 
 3
The Challenge of Social Ethics 
English Summary of Doctoral Thesis Den Samfundsetiske Udfordring 
 
phenomenon, has not been a problem throughout human history.  There has, to be sure, been a vari-
ety of different religious interpretations of the meaning of death for our understanding of human life 
and that which might follow in the hereafter.  But the simple fact that we die has been taken as a 
given and natural condition that one addressed in a practical manner.  Death occurred when the 
heart stopped beating and one was certain that it would not start beating again.  That is no longer the 
case.  Medical technology, through what is called progress, has put us in a position to keep people 
alive who have been unconscious for years, and for whom there is no chance of a return to con-
sciousness.  Death and medical technology thereby suddenly become conditions that must be ap-
proached normatively as it becomes necessary to take a position on the question of when a human 
being should be considered to be alive or dead. 
 
This is an example of the way an ethical problem arises from a social practice, which is reflected, at 
first pass, in our categorisation of the human being as a creature that is bound to its nature and is not 
immediately connected to ethical concerns.  This state of affairs is reframed as a medical and tech-
nological problem through medical practice and through those ethical codes, inherent in the sphere 
of medicine, which demand that technical progress must, finally, preserve life.  But medical ethics 
itself becomes insufficient or meaningless when confronted, as in this case,  with the question of 
whether or not it makes sense to keep a human being that will never return to consciousness alive.  
Indeed, it confronts us with the question of whether or not it is the right thing to do.  It is interest-
ing, also, to note that we cannot frame this problem if we confine ourselves to questions about the 
normative problems that bear upon our relation to death, medical ethics and modern technology, 
even if we seem to have enough problems as it is.  These problems, which themselves pose enor-
mous difficulties, extend into other areas of life, where the same problems again impose them-
selves. 
 
Holland, for example, has taken the issue so far that terminally ill patients can now seek the ap-
proval of a commission to have a doctor end their lives.  This poses deep ethical problems, which 
we may prefer to dismiss with reference to the sixth commandment.  Thou shalt not kill—not even, 
and perhaps especially, if you are doctor; and no commission can change that.  But can we in this 
way demand that a human being must live when life is no longer tolerable?  There are no easy an-
swers in this regard.  It is clear, however, that ethical problems that at first pass seem to be confined 
to a specific situation—in this case, to the irremediable pain and suffering of an individual patient—
soon grows into a set of ethical problems that concern us all as social beings.  What should our 
stance be on what were previously taboos against killing?  More specifically, how do we reconcile 
this practice with the traditional conception of a doctor as a preserver of life?  In so far as the taboo 
has already been broken in Holland, a whole new arena for attempts to grasp our relation to life and 
death in modern society as a whole opens up.  This is the case even if we have not yet introduced 
comparable rights in, for example, in our own country.  A traditional symbolic order is being dis-
mantled and in its stead a new symbolic order is being created, in which we are no longer guided by 
an age-old taboo that bars us from the taking of human life.  It has become a matter of ethical 
choice—a matter of making a decision about whether it is right or wrong to engage in such an ac-
tion. 
 
This raises ethical questions of a second order: the question of whether or not it is right to address 
this type of problem as an ethical one in the first place.  The point, however, is that ethical problems 
are inescapable the moment they have been articulated.  One cannot choose not to address the prob-
lem; one cannot claim that it is not a problem.  Or, perhaps more precisely, one can do so only to 
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the extent that ethical problems can be enmeshed in a sense of normalcy that avoids the articulation 
of the problems as ethical in nature. 
 
It has been suggested, for example, that the incinerators of a Copenhagen crematorium be connected 
to a heating plant so that the cremation of the dead could at the same time come to benefit the con-
sumer and serve the needs of the economy—as it might be put in commonplace, functional terms, 
where our sense of all living conditions is eradicated in the absolutions of utilitarianism.  The prob-
lems posed by mad cow disease were solved in precisely this manner. The affected livestock was 
incinerated in heating plants and the ashes we thereafter used to manufacture concrete.  This ap-
pears to us quite normal and does not occasion much discussion. 
 
It is also possible to pass ethical problems over by deferring them, making them problems for others 
to deal with at a later time.  When the experimental reactor at Risø, in Denmark, was to be closed, it 
was made known that it had accumulated a substantial amount of radioactive waste that no one had 
considered how to store through the 500,000 years needed for its decay.  The reason that was given 
for this oversight was that, at the time when the experimental plant was built, it had been assumed 
that nuclear power would be introduced in Denmark more generally, and that one would therefore 
have to face a much larger problem, the solution to which would also solve the problems faced by 
Risø.  What is most interesting in this case, however, is that even researchers who were not driven 
by ‘normal’ economic pressures set such a problem aside.  In this case the problem is one of passing 
a problem on to coming generations over a time span that by far exceeds what is considered a cul-
tural epoch.  Moreover, only a society as technologically advanced as our own will be able to ade-
quately contain the radioactive materials.  One has therefore not just given the task of storing our 
nuclear waste to coming generations; one has made it necessary for them to maintain, and very 
likely to surpass, our level of technical achievement.  But since the coming generations are not yet 
born they are in no position to complain.  And when they do finally arrive on the scene we will our-
selves have withdrawn beyond the reach of their anger.  Or might they simply take the problem as a 
fact of nature?  They could do so in much the same way we construe the desert in northern Africa as 
a natural phenomenon, obscuring the fact that in ancient times it was considered to be Rome’s gran-
ary and must therefore have been possessed of an enormous fecundity.  The desert is the result of 
the exploitation of its natural potential and represents an ecological disaster with cultural causes that 
later generations have accepted as natural. 
 
It is therefore only when cultural contradictions appear as a pressing problem for someone that the 
ethical problem comes to light and gets articulated.  One example of this is the collision between, 
on the one hand, the pharmaceutical industry’s wish to patent the results of its research in order to 
make a return on their investment and, on the other, the struggle against Aids in southern Africa 
where the South African government has allowed the production of cheap copies of Aids medicines 
to ward off a catastrophe that threatens the whole region.  It is possible to argue, and with good rea-
sons, on either side of the issue; but these reasons collide and raise a set of ethical problems that 
cannot be reduced to the decision that will eventually be reached in the courtroom where the disput-
ing parties can confront each other.  That is, there is a primacy inherent in our ethical problems, a 
sovereignty which cannot be usurped by legal or political decisions unless, of course, the manifest 
conditions that occasioned the problems can find a satisfactory resolution in those decisions.  But a 
solution to the contradictions that are inherent in these conditions will often simply not be available.  
There will in most cases be good arguments for either construal of the situation, and the ethical di-
mension will therefore come to appear as a supreme challenge in a tragic contradiction that admits 
of no resolution.  But a decision must be made even in this case; it must be based on careful consid-
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eration where the criteria upon which the decision is grounded must themselves be accounted for.  
This can happen in major political questions, where we are forced to choose between alternatives or 
to make a choice based on best estimates.  But it can also happen in the realm of everyday living, 
where ethical challenges arise that exceed those tasks that were originally at hand. 
 
Consider the case of Kate Runge.  When she inspected a senior citizen’s home in her capacity as 
medical officer for one of the Danish regions, she was confronted with what were to her mind unac-
ceptable general living conditions as compared with what is considered reasonable in Danish soci-
ety.  Runge made her criticisms public and began to experience the pressures of the administrative 
system, which finally transferred her to other functions in the civil service.  A routine inspection 
became an existential situation as an officer of the state, who was expected to concern herself only 
with narrowly circumscribed medical issues, raised the far more expansive problem of how the eld-
erly might maintain their dignity in a modern, administratively focused welfare society. 
 
Ethical problems emerge from social practices and appear before us through the contradictions 
within and among these practices.  Ethics has, in this way, both its origin and its terminus in social 
practice.  There is, however, a sovereignty or primacy inherent in ethical ways of framing problems 
that prevent their full integration into social practices.  We can say that we find our bearings in so-
cial practice by way of our ethical problems.  We are guided by the question of what norms are to 
hold sway in social life.  Our ethical problems lead us to the question of how we ought organize 
modern society and where we are to find reasonable grounds for the norms that are ultimately to 
support it.  
 
 
2  The Phenomenology of Social Ethics 
 
The point has so far been that ethics brings itself to bear upon any aspect of life in modern society 
whenever such an aspect loses its immediate meaning and a question arises about what norms ought 
to apply in the given situation.  What is novel about my approach is that the personal relationship is 
not all that is immediately brought to bear upon ethics, as is largely the case in K. E. Løgstrup’s 
phenomenological approach to these problems.  Mediated social problems, I argue, can also impose 
themselves as immediate ethical problems.  We can say that our ethical issues break through the 
given structuration of social relations as these are formed in the social order—an order that is given 
always at a particular time.  Ethics thereby come to be existentially binding in social life; they con-
stitute the approach through which we relate ourselves to this life in the way in which it is manifest 
for us immediately in a given situation.  The essential point is that ethical challenges are mounted so 
radically that all facticity is shattered at the moment at which the individual is confronted with the 
ethical issue in a given situation.  The individual comes to be ethically determined by social life and 
existentially embedded in it.  It subsequently turns out that the individual human being cannot 
maintain a social relation as an immediate existential matter because social relations are at the same 
time mediated relations.  What is essential here, meanwhile, is that social mediation is shattered as 
facticity and becomes an existential matter.  The most complicated social affairs can by this means 
become existential ones, which effect the individual immediately as a challenge of social ethics that 
the individual must take stock of. 
 
It is not difficult to see the many challenges for social ethics that face us.  The major problem is 
how to relate ourselves to them.  Once we have been thrown into one of the problems framed by 
social ethics, the problem becomes one of how we are to think it through, and thereafter one of how 
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we are to make a decision about what must be considered right and wrong.  The first is a problem of 
social science and concerns the individual’s relation to social life.  The second is a problem of phi-
losophy and concerns the sorts of ethics that are required in order to relate oneself to the challenges 
of social ethics that we are thrown into.  This can be elaborated through an example focusing on 
organ transplantation. 
 
We are familiar with the technological advances that make it possible to transplant bodily organs 
and by this means to cure people of great agonies caused by disease and to prevent their death.  The 
carrying out of organ transplantations from one human being to another in itself raises ethical prob-
lems.  It is obvious that people in great agony have an undeniable wish to be cured.  As long as one 
human being can receive an organ from another human being who willingly parts with it, the ethical 
problem seems limited.  It is difficult to see why someone could not give an organ to another if that 
someone fully consents to the operation and is not harmed thereby.  An example could be to donate 
a kidney.  It does, however, become immediately more complicated if there is talk of the transplan-
tation of organs from a dead human being since the proposition that this constitutes a gift is now 
untenable.  A gift presupposes reciprocity.  When an organ is taken from a corpse there is talk sim-
ply of the utilisation of the dead person’s organs.  The Kantian injunction, that we are not to use 
other people solely as means, seems in any case in rick of being transgressed.  The other must al-
ways be a goal unto itself.  If we add to this such cases where the donor has died in a traffic acci-
dent the situation becomes still more complicated.  The death is here not owed to natural causes but 
is, rather, produced by traffic conditions in modern society. The next step is that peroplpe begin to 
sell their organs, as is already happening on a global scale.  Here, too, social conditions produce 
donors.  In this case it is the often hopeless social and economic conditions of some human beings 
that are grossly exploited, and it is precisely for this reason that trade in bodily organs is prohibited 
almost everywhere.  Nonetheless, such trade exists, as it does with so many other prohibited goods 
and services. 
 
This example shows how the technological means to cure kidney disease through transplantation 
leads to a problem of social ethics, one which weaves itself into the reproduction of modern, global 
society. 
 
 
3 The Dimensions of Social Ethics 
 
In order to begin an analysis of such complicated relationships, it is necessary to draw the funda-
mental distinction between, on the one hand, the reproduction of modern, global society and, on the 
other, the ethical problems it raises.  This is not to say that these relationships are not intertwined 
and, therefore, in principle inseparable.  But when one undertakes to analyse the problem, one must 
first look at how a given case contributes to social reproduction and thereafter look at what consid-
eration must be given to the ethical problems framed by it.  Otherwise the problems become simply 
too obscure, too impenetrable.  The first set of problems belongs to the social sciences and does not 
distinguish itself from a series of other problems of the social sciences.  The other set of problems is 
of a philosophical nature and is concerned with how the first set of problems is to be given consid-
eration from an ethical point of view.  The pertinent theoretical difficulty is that of connecting these 
two points of view. 
 
This, then, is our point of departure for a consideration of the importance of ethics in modern soci-
ety.  We do not have to invent ethical problems; nor is there any specialized group that is occupied 
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by them.  They are something that all human beings on the planet are thrown into every day and that 
no one can elude.  The problematic, therefore, is quite real and well worth our careful consideration.  
Errors are possible in the way we think about the problems and the conclusions we arrive at.  But it 
is precisely for this reason that careful consideration and contemplation are called for; it is a chal-
lenge for thought that is well worth accepting. 
 
People have always set themselves ethical problems, especially if we take the word ‘ethical’ in its 
broadest sense, as a reflection upon the norms that ought to be in force in social life.  All peoples in 
all places and at all times share in this preoccupation with ethics, which cuts across the distinctions 
we make between the many different forms of society that are found in history.  We know this be-
cause our ethical considerations are inscribed in the history of religion, which stretches from primi-
tive religions, through the major religions and on to modern society.  The religious myths of primi-
tive societies display a reflexive relation to the problems of living.  This relation is expressed ex-
plicitly in the theologies of the major religions.  But what comparable function can be found in 
modern society?  It is my claim that precisely ethics serves as our means to reflect upon our norms.  
That is to say, I take ethics to be a new way of thinking about the all-pervading norms that consti-
tute and govern human conditions and human practice in its broadest sense.  It is an extension of 
similar deliberations undertaken earlier within the religious traditions.  The major difference, 
meanwhile, is that whereas the religious traditions were able to constitute a normative relation that 
could regulate human life by inscribing individual and social practice in universalising divine cos-
mologies, we are left, today, with what is ultimately a wholly open question and one that cannot 
occupy the immediately regulative position hitherto occupied by religious systems in human socie-
ties. 
 
There have, then, been a number of decisive social changes that involve, in each case, the passage 
to modernity.  We no longer have a shared frame of reference, provided by a unifying religious 
world picture, which might provide a basis upon which to create a social and moral order.  This 
applies ultimately to everyone.  Different kinds of questions present themselves to us because ethi-
cal problems arise from the situations and relationships that constitute an individual human life.  
But what they have in common is that this variety of problems can be traced back to an ethical core 
and that ethics, therefore, has become central to the life of the individual wherever it might find 
itself in global society. 
 
There is a dimension of ethics that is the proper concern of the sociology of religion in so far as 
ethics must serve the same function in modern societies that religion served in premodern societies.  
That is, ethics must provide a common, normative frame of reference in local situations for the con-
stitution of social order.  From this point of view, ethics is construed as analogous to the religious 
systems we are familiar with through the history of religion.  But this approach has its limits be-
cause there is a difference in kind between religious systems on the one hand and ethics on the 
other.  Religious systems are large, imaginary attempts to solve the normative problem of reproduc-
ing human society.  As such, we find religious systems full of sweeping solutions to pervasive prob-
lems about the norms that ought to ground the reproduction of human life.  Ethics, by contrast, is 
the rational consideration of what norms can be made to obtain in modern societies.   
 
The same applies when we construe the situation from a sociological point of view.  Here, too, we 
encounter the question of a common interpretative horizon for a human society.  I therefore believe 
that it is through sociology that we must approach the question of why ethics has become so central 
a concern of modern society.  It falls to sociology to build a bridge between, on the one hand, reli-
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gious systems as a solution to the problem of social order and, on the other, ethics as a search for a 
tenable social order or morality.  It is through sociology that we can see that we are dealing with the 
same set of problems.  It could, at this point, be objected that it is primarily of antiquated academic 
interest to make such an observation.  After all, we can no longer make reference to the interpreta-
tive horizon offered to us by religion in our attempts to resolve our common ethical problems.  We 
are modern.  This could, indeed, be a very correct objection, if we were dealing only with the prob-
lem of subsuming the two sets of conditions under the same category.  Consider, by way of anal-
ogy, the problem of determining various kinds of flora by way of shared traits that establish lines of 
kinship.  The point here is that such determinations are of epistemic interest and are, in this case, of 
such interest because the introduction of the sociology of religion gives us new means to understand 
what we are dealing with when we compare and contrast religious systems with ethics in modern 
society.  There is talk, here, of a likeness which allows us to understand a variety.  It is my assump-
tion that modernity must be understood on a par with religious systems, as we know these both 
from the major religions and through the religious beliefs of primitive peoples.  This parity must be 
established as a determined form of understanding through which we attempt to master the task of 
creating a cohesive interpretative horizon, which can serve as background for the maintenance or 
creation of a normatively grounded social order or morality.  This is the similarity, or likeness, that 
obtains between these two sets of conditions.  The difference is that religious systems constitute a 
collective interpretative totality, which was capable of delivering a practical basis for social order 
throughout the millennia and in very different societies.  We moderns, at least at first pass, have 
only a search for a social or moral order.  This search itself comes to shape a form of understanding 
that looks somewhat like its religious precursors in so far as what is sought is, in the last instance, 
the same thing, namely, a set of tenable norms for social order. 
 
 
4 Theses Toward a Modern, Critical Social Ethics 
 
It is my aim to discuss whether or not it is possible to articulate a social ethics in modern society. 
 
It is my thesis that it is no longer possible to determine definitive norms for any life situation what-
soever in modern society.  There are no longer any given authoritative norms, nor is there an ulti-
mate ethical theory, to make any such determination possible.  All norms are open to discussion.  It 
is therefore only possible to articulate a critical and negative social ethics.  All ethics in modern 
society must proceed from the critical objection, which becomes possible when a conflict arises 
over the norms that ought to be in force. 
 
The social communication of ethics hereby comes to be of decisive importance.  What is decisive is 
whether or not we can create open institutions, in which all implicated parties have a real opportu-
nity to air their critical objections and hereby the opportunity to participate in the determination of 
norms that will have a decisive influence on their lives. 
 
The classical problem of political philosophy—that of the consistency of ethics, politics and jus-
tice—is hereby invoked.  This relationship has been articulated in positive terms throughout the 
history of political philosophy, from Plato and Aristotle, through Kant and Hegel, to Rawls and 
Habermas.  Social order was to be secured through a positive mediation between ethics and politics. 
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It is, by contrast, my thesis that social order in modern society must be understood in negative 
terms, in the sense that it is the possibility of criticism that forms the basis for the social order of 
modern society. 
 
That is, I take as my point of departure the classical way of framing the problem of the possibility of 
social order.  I situate it among the problems of practical philosophy.  But I then turn the whole of 
this frame on its head in relation to the tradition that extends from antiquity and through to modern 
times by claiming that it is only through criticism and negation that an ethically grounded social 
order can be created in modern society. 
 
It is especially through a critical and comprehensive reading of Habermas’ work that it has been 
possible to reach this insight.  In several places, Habermas speaks of ‘Das Nein-sagen-Können’, the 
ability to say no: the decisive importance of negation, the possibility of dissent, the reasoned objec-
tion.  It is this perspective that I adopt in examining Habermas’ work, and which I thereafter take as 
a basis for the constitution of a critically oriented social ethics in modern society.  It is this critical 
reading of Habermas’ theory that will ultimately come to support the whole of my presentation. 
 
In this way, Habermas’ theory will come to take a prominent place in what follows.  It amounts to a 
new reading of Habermas’ theory: one that remains within the tradition of critical theory, but which 
distinguishes itself from the bulk of the interpretations of Habermas’ work by not explicating, as is 
the standard procedure, a positive theory.  It is also possible, as will become clear in what follows, 
to read Habermas’ theory as a critical theory. 
 
Adorno’s social ethics must be mentioned in this regard.  Adorno has articulated a negatively ori-
ented social ethics, in which he claims that freedom must always be grasped as a determined nega-
tion.  The individual human being’s freedom consists, according to Adorno, in the ability to say 
‘No!’  Habermas adds that this ‘No!’ must be accompanied by good reasons. 
 
The social ethics that I will here articulate finds itself suspended in the tension between Adorno and 
Habermas.  In the tradition of critical theory, the determined negation is emphasised, but Habermas 
extends this view and emphasises that it is not sufficient to confine oneself to negation.  According 
to Habermas, negation can only constitute the necessary mediation of a positive statement—one 
that, when supported by good reasons, can create consensus between the parties involved.  ‘No!’ 
says Habermas, ‘and with good reason.’   
 
 
5 The Four Guiding Questions 
 
From the outset, then, we are dealing with a phenomenological state of affairs.  Ethics comes to 
occupy the centre of modern society, which occasions the following questions.  First, why is it like 
this; how did ethics come to occupy the centre of social life?  Second, what does it mean for ethics 
to be the central concern of modern society; of what significance is this centrality?  Third, what 
kind of ethics might adequately address the problems of modern society?  Fourth, of what signifi-
cance is such an ethics?  It is to these questions that we will now turn. 
 
The first question is concerned with the reason why ethical problems have come to occupy the cen-
tre of modern life.  This question, however, refers us to a much larger discussion of modern society 
and one that can only be carried out in relation to the philosophical and sociological traditions.  The 
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philosophical discussion proceeds from Hegel’s idea that modern society is fundamentally divided 
and that it is therefore impossible to articulate a social ethics in modern society.  The classical so-
ciological discussion emphasises a series of conditions that have contributed to those violent up-
heavals, in the wake of which there is no longer any given morality in modern society.  Marx em-
phasised the economic transformation of society.  Weber stressed secularisation and rationalisation.  
Durkheim underscored the dissolution of mechanical solidarity.  Horkheimer and Adorno focused 
on the contradiction implicit in rationalisation and Luhmann emphasised the endless creation of 
autonomous systems.  Habermas is one of the few who have attempted to indicate the possibility of 
a new social ethics in modern society, one that is oriented toward communicative conditions. 
 
By this means we arrive at the question of what it means for ethics to occupy so central a place in 
modern society, or the significance of this position.  We must here discuss how social life has be-
come an immediate existential concern in a way not previously seen.  It has become necessary for 
the individual to develop an extreme reflexivity in relation to social life because all aspects of life 
must be reflected immediately while at the same time containing impenetrable social mediations. 
 
We come now to the question of the kind of ethics that might most adequately address the problems 
of modern society.  Here a discussion of a set of ethical proposals that have played an essential role 
in the modern age is surely relevant.  We will here be concerned with existential ethics, deontologi-
cal ethics, phenomenological ethics, utilitarianism, the ethics of systems, communicative ethics and 
political ethics. 
 
Our discussion of these different ethical proposals will lead us toward the question of which of them 
might be relevant and what such an ethics might mean for modern society.  As already mentioned, 
the necessity of creating institutions that provide a place for ethical deliberation is a fundamental 
thesis of my inquiry.  The no less fundamental schism or bifurcation (Entzweiung)  within modern 
society of which Hegel spoke cannot be overcome.  But it can be mediated more or less success-
fully, more or less well.  The relationship between ethics, morals, justice and politics must also be 
discussed in this connection.  
 
 
6 Method 
 
It is now possible to ask how even to begin this task of contemplating the ethical condition of mod-
ern society.  It is a difficult problem because the problems of ethics reveal themselves as an impene-
trable manifold of problems.  After all, they are connected with the individual’s practical affairs, 
with the reproduction of individual institutions and with the reproduction of collective global soci-
ety.  It is therefore impossible to discover the core of all our ethical problems and say that here, 
then, is the ethical problem of modernity among the manifold of problems that appear to be at hand.  
All we can say on the phenomenological approach is that there is a manifold of ethical problems in 
modern society, an impenetrable manifold of ethical problems, which imposes itself upon our lives. 
 
We could then try to take a sociological approach and identify that secularisation and rationalisation 
that has lead to modernity.  This, for example, is the road taken by Weber in his sociological work, 
including his work on the sociology of religion; and it is also the road travelled by Habermas in his 
theory of communicative action.  This approach offers many advantages.  But our ethical problems 
cannot be understood by sociology alone. 
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Many therefore begin with a philosophical discussion of ethics.  This approach also brings advan-
tages with it because a purely philosophical discussion can clarify both what ethics means and what 
kind of ethics must in principle be considered preferable.  But it also suffers from a specific weak-
ness, namely, that it is likely to produce an idea of ethics that is wholly unrelated to social and insti-
tutional reality. 
 
We must therefore in what follows draw on a series of different disciplines.  Philosophy must, of 
course, be assigned a central place because ethics is a fundamentally philosophical discipline, a 
branch of practical philosophy.  This assignment is based on two observations.  First, ethics has 
from the very beginning been carried out under the auspices of philosophy—a tradition that goes 
back to antiquity.  Second, it is only within philosophy that the distinction between right and wrong 
is discussed; and this is a distinction that I believe is decisive for all ethical deliberation.  But phi-
losophy cannot stand alone because it will never reach the social complexities that shape modern 
societies.  Sociology has, to this end, been developed as an independent science the task of which is 
to examine the normative reproduction of modern society.  It should be noted, meanwhile, that Aris-
totle had already worked out a kind of sociology insofar as he approached the constitutions of the 
city states in a phenomenological manner.  He collected and compared such constitutions in order to 
determine how an ideal, or best possible, constitution would look.  We ought, again, to mention the 
sociology of religion.  It is a special discipline within sociology, the task of which is to investigate 
the importance of religious forms of understanding for the normative reproduction of different kinds 
of society. 
 
One normally seeks to keep the different scientific disciplines separated.  They have, after all, been 
differentiated by a long historical process.  Critical theory, by contrast, traditionally emphasises the 
need to draw upon different kinds of disciplines and subjects in order to be able to understand and 
criticise the reproduction of modern society.  What follows also invokes this tradition, which sees 
the task of social science not just as one explaining social conditions, as was claimed by the positiv-
ists, but also one of interpreting social phenomena, as one does in the hermeneutic tradition.  Fi-
nally, the social sciences ought to strive to produce a critique of the pathologies of social reproduc-
tion.  When we take the importance or meaning of ethics in modern society as our theme we must 
strive to maintain a critical stance because the ethical problematic in modern society appears as an 
exceedingly thorny set of problems that can be solved only with great difficulty.  It concerns the 
very reproduction of modern society as will become clear in what follows. 
 
I am thus trying to discuss the challenges of social ethics in modern society in manner that is consis-
tent with the tradition of critical theory.  My attempt is based on a series of different disciplinary 
approaches, but it would be wrong simply to conflate these without an eye to the differences among 
them as regards their problem complexes, their disciplinary perspectives and their traditions.  In the 
following chapters, therefore, I try to work systematically through the individual approaches in rela-
tion to the problems that are set out by social ethics.  It is my conviction that one must read any 
given set of disciplinary problems in the light of the particular field’s history and that only through 
such a reading does one really come to understand the core of the problems that are discussed there.  
This is also essential to hermeneutics, which, to my mind, ought to exercise a decisive influence on 
the human and social sciences.  Since hermeneutics therefore plays an essential role in my under-
standing of critical theory, we might also say that I am here making an attempt at a critical herme-
neutics.  I have applied this method in my earlier treatise Ethik und Demokratie, which also shares 
an interest in many of the problems I have set out here, but there centred on a discussion of the de-
mocratic city states of antiquity. 
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Habermas applies this method in The Theory of Communicative Action.  In his statement of this 
method he says that the appropriation of the historical evolution of theory makes it possible to see 
how the problems that were taken as themes in the classical tradition are carried over into the theo-
retical discussions of our own time. 
 
It is this conception of a critical hermeneutic method that grounds the historical orientation of the 
following chapters.  I try to discuss the essential problems that are immediately raised by modern 
life, taking the history of ethical theory as my point of departure.  The idea is to give the current 
challenges of social ethics a theoretical depth and an historical grounding that can contribute to 
identifying what is essential in these discussions. 
 
A number of the theories I discuss, however, cannot be unambiguously situated within particular 
disciplinary traditions.  There is a set of theories that operate on the boundary between different 
disciplines, precisely because of their connection to critical theory.  Habermas’ theory, for example, 
includes philosophical and sociological dimensions, as well as those drawn from political science 
and the theory of justice.  It is not always possible to make a clear disciplinary distinction in the 
invocation of these dimensions.  This means that many of the theories I discuss will be treated sev-
eral times from the different disciplinary vantages.  When one applies such a method repetition is 
unavoidable.  I have taken care, however, to avoid unnecessary repetitions by clearly marking prob-
lems that have already been discussed.  On the other hand, a problem can arise in regard to the in-
troduction and treatment of particular theories.  Some theories, for example, can be equally suitable 
for treatment in one chapter as in another.  This is the case with utilitarianism, which is an ethical 
theory that originates in the 19th Century, but which also dominates today.  It would be fitting, 
therefore, discuss this theory both in Chapter I, which concerns the classical discussion about the 
relationship between ethics and modernity, and in Chapter III, which concerns more recent philoso-
phical discussions about this relationship.  I have, in that case, chosen to defer discussion of utili-
tarianism until Chapter III.  Another example is Kant’s ethics and his political philosophy, both of 
which are discussed systematically in Chapter I, but which are also discussed in a number of places 
where they are of relevance. 
 
The literature will appear somewhat unmanageable when one has as one’s ambition to at one and 
the same time participate in the interdisciplinarity of critical theory and provide a systematic treat-
ment of each disciplinary perspective.  I have tried to solve this problem by introducing only those 
theories that I find to be of greatest relevance.  It is, however, unavoidable that some perhaps rea-
sonable candidates will be left untreated.  A work of this kind will therefore often find itself outside 
all disciplinary traditions.  On the other hand, I believe that it is only through this interdisciplinary 
and this critical hermeneutical perspective that it is possible to discuss the challenges of social eth-
ics in a qualified manner.  They simply cannot be reduced to a single disciplinary perspective. 
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7 Content of the Dissertation 
 
I will now, on this background, and with reference to the four guiding questions already mentioned, 
briefly summarise the content of this dissertation.  I will not, of course, provide the full substance of 
my argumentation, which I will leave to the body of the work. 
 
 
7.1 Chapter I:  The classical philosophical discussion of the 
relationship between ethics and modernity. 
 
In Chapter I, I will examine how the problems of social ethics are articulated within classical phi-
losophy.  The set of problems that we will be dealing with here can be traced back to antiquity and 
is taken up by Kant, Hegel, Kierkegaard and Marx in the period that extends from the close of the 
18th Century to the middle of the 19th.  Kant’s ethics form the basis of a discussion of the impor-
tance of ethics in modern society because Kant articulated a universal ethics that forms a secular 
philosophical synthesis of the ancient Greek and the Judeo-Christian traditions.  Kant’s practical 
philosophy can be read as a critical philosophy that establishes criteria of validity for moral as well 
as political action.  As such, it is a somewhat grandiose moral and political philosophy for modern 
society, and is as yet unsurpassed in philosophy.  We are here brought to the limit of this critical 
philosophy, however, since the question arises of how to mediate between this philosophy and so-
cial life. 
 
It is precisely on this point that Hegel brings his critique of Kant to bear.  Hegel tries to solve this 
problem of mediation is his philosophy of rights.  He takes as his point of departure the problem of 
radical subjectivity, in the form already articulated by Kant, and tries thereafter to find a mediation 
for this subjectivity in the family and in the institutions of modern civil society.  Hegel concludes 
that particular moralities can be created within the individual institutions. 
 
Hegel’s next problem is that of how a general morality is possible.  Here the state comes to be a 
decisive factor.  Hegel’s problem is whether the difference between particular moralities can be 
overcome in the state, and thereby raised to the level of a general morality, or whether the state 
must rather precede the particular moralities as a determination of them.  Hegel is ambivalent on 
this point.  His philosophy of right suggests both the democratic public constitution of a general 
morality and the totalitarian state-oriented domination of civil society. 
 
Kierkegaard and Marx bring their critique to bear on this point.  Kierkegaard insists upon the sover-
eignty of radical subjectivity in relation to the general.  But Kierkegaard can only maintain this ac-
count by setting it against a religious interpretative horizon, which proceeds from the event of 
Christ, and which lacks all contemporaneity with modern civil society.  In his early works, Marx 
observed the decisive importance of democracy for the constitution of general morality in modern 
civil society.  But this critique is thereafter grounded in the utopian idea that the fundamental con-
tradictions of civil society can be transcended by the annulment of the division of labour in modern 
society.  In this way, the early Marx arrives at the idea of a substantial morality that is also totalitar-
ian in nature. 
 
Kierkegaard and the early Marx, then, accomplish the radicalisation of the Hegelian schism (Entz-
weiung) in modern civil society without being able to overcome it.  We are therefore left with the 
fundamental problem of this division in modern society after our encounter with the classical phi-
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losophical discussion.  It is on this background that we must examine how the same problem has 
been discussed within sociology from 1850 to the present. 
 
 
7.2 Chapter II: The sociological discussion of the relationship 
between ethics and modernity 
 
A continuous line of thought can be traced from Marx, through Weber, Durkheim, Horkheimer, 
Adorno, Marcuse, Foucault and Luhmann, all of whom have in one way or another observed that 
the reproduction of modern society has been detached from the moral dimension, and all of whom 
find it difficult to see how morality might once again be integrated into modern society.  When we 
follow the evolution of sociological theory we become aware of an increasing repression of ethical 
problems so that it becomes in itself difficult to integrate these in a morally oriented theory of mod-
ern society.  Moral conundrums founder, for Marx, in the abstract economic reproduction of mod-
ern capitalism, in which the concrete loses its importance as it is sublated to the general economic 
abstraction.  Weber takes this line of thought still further, generalising it in terms of a general theory 
of rationalisation according to which instrumental action sets all moral considerations on one side.  
Durkheim’s work indicates something similar.  The division of labour, to be sure, exercises a unify-
ing influence in modern society; but it still and all lacks the strength to establish a new moral order.  
Horkheimer and Adorno carry the theories of Marx and Weber further, radicalising them in such a 
way that the abstraction implicit in the first act of exchange itself comes to serve as the original sin 
that grounds the tyranny of the abstract over the concrete. 
 
Marcuse takes this analysis still further.  If Horkheimer and Adorno had observed that rationalisa-
tion itself had its origin in the domination of nature, and that this rationalisation is continued by the 
natural sciences, Marcuse connects this ‘rational’ domination of the natural world with social domi-
nation.  Social domination is thus rationalised by means of a technical and instrumental rationality 
that ensures the apparent naturalness of these social forms of domination. 
 
Foucault’s analysis identifies discipline, in contrast to rationality, as that which binds people to-
gether in modern society.  Luhmann’s theory proposes that all moral relationships are marginalised 
in the differentiation of modern society into autonomous systems that are connected by communica-
tion. 
 
Bourdieu is also part of this tradition in so far as he combines Marx, Weber and Durkheim in his 
institutional analyses and shows how social compulsion imposes itself on the individual.  But 
Bourdieu maintains the classical enlightenment ideal and claims that the universal constitutes the 
final criterion for all social action.  Bourdieu develops his theory through particular institutional 
analyses and this forces him to leave unanswered the Hegelian question of how it is possible to cre-
ate a coherent moral order in modern society.          
 
Habermas’ theory of communicative action is, of the theories here considered, the only one that 
offers a coherent, reflexive account of the ethical problems faced by modern society.  This leads 
him towards an articulation of both an ethics and a political theory.  There is, accordingly, an intrin-
sic relationship between sociology and philosophy in Habermas’ theory.  Habermas works through 
the whole of the sociological tradition in order to arrive at his own theory and thereby to support his 
claim that communicative action has become a ‘practical truth’ in modern society.  In his later 
works, he shows how this idea can be developed within ethics, politics and the theory of justice.  
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Habermas’ theory of communicative action therefore occupies a privileged position in our discus-
sion of the ethical challenges that modern society faces. 
 
Habermas constructs his theory by neutralising some of the areas that other theories maintain are 
problematic.  The systemic reproduction of modern society is ethically neutral, according to 
Habermas, as long as it does not encroach upon essential areas of moral concern in modern society.  
But in so far as life, in the variety of forms that it takes in modern society, is increasingly mediated 
by this systemic process of reproduction, it becomes enormously difficult to maintain any sense of 
ethical neutrality in regards to the world of systems.  The schism in modern society that Hegel drew 
attention to is thereby confirmed in various ways by the whole sociological tradition. 
 
We will proceed on this basis to discuss more contemporary issues of importance for the relation-
ship between ethics and modernity. 
 
 
7.3 Chapter III: Contemporary philosophical discussions of the 
relationship between ethics and modernity 
 
Ethics is from the outset a philosophical discipline.  It concerns itself with the validity of various 
ethical conceptions, and discusses these both in their own right and in comparison with other con-
ceptions.  Ethics is discussed as such in the realm of practical philosophy, which includes ethics and 
political philosophy.  In attempting to understand the challenges of social ethics, however, it is not 
enough to discover a correct ethical position.  It is just as important to understand the differences 
that obtain between the different ethical theories.  The sociological importance of different ethical 
proposals is of interest on the background of the sociological discussion of modernity.  Existential-
ism is, for example, an expression of the extreme detachment of the individual from society; phe-
nomenological ethical proposals are a search for precultural norms; utilitarianism expresses ration-
alisation of society in terms of ends; the ethics of systems is an expression of the autonomous dif-
ferentiation of social systems; and communicative ethics, finally, exhibits the democratic tendencies 
of modern society.  The point here is that these ethical proposals are all possible perspectives, which 
must be given consideration in a discussion of the challenges raised by social ethics in modern soci-
ety.  The aim, of course, is to discover which proposal might be adequate under current conditions.  
A sociological discussion of the various ethical proposals available in modern society would be of 
little interest, however, if it was not connected to a philosophical discussion of the conditions they 
address.  Ethics is at bottom about the validity of the various ethical and moral conceptions and it is 
therefore meaningless to carry out ethical discussions without an eye for the problem of validity.  
But philosophical discussion tends to ignore the deep connection of ethical theories to social life, 
leading to an insufficient understanding of the relevant theories.  It is therefore important to attempt 
to combine these perspectives. 
 
It is on this basis that I would like to examine the different kinds of ethics that have had a prominent 
place in ethical discussion in modern society.  To this end, I have selected some prominent theories 
that I believe can serve as sociological ideal types, indicating major ethical conceptions that play a 
decisive role for us today.  The aim is to discover the kinds of ethics that, from a sociological point 
of view, might adequately support further discussion of the challenges of social ethics in modern 
society. 
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In order better to structure the sociological ideal types of these ethical theories I will proceed from 
the schism we have already introduced through Hegel and that we have radicalised by way of 
Kierkegaard and Marx.  The point there was that modern society is divided between individuality 
and collectivity.  On this basis, I will look, on the one hand, for ethical theories that point us in the 
direction of the individual and, on the other hand, for theories that point us in the direction of shared 
institutional arrangements.  The diagnoses of classical sociology, as we have already seen these 
articulated, will serve as a guide.  Here a rupture in our immediate sense of morality was seen as the 
basic problem of ethics in modern society.  A number of these theories also emphasised, albeit in 
different ways, the rationalisation of modern society.  Weber stressed instrumental rationality; 
Horkheimer, Adorno and Marcuse identified a species of irrationalisation; and Luhmann drew at-
tention to the rationalisation implicit in the formation of autonomous systems. 
 
In adopting this perspective, constructed on the basis of sociological ideal types, we must, on the 
one hand, look for existential ethical proposals and, on the other, for institutional proposals.  
Among the existential proposals we find Kant’s deontological ethics along with more modern ver-
sions of existentialism and, finally, those proposals that are oriented by phenomenology.  Among 
the institutional proposals, utilitarianism is the most important.  Next to these, are the system-
oriented proposals that have been inspired by Luhmann’s sociological theory.  Communicative eth-
ics can be seen, finally, as a proposal to unite the existential and institutional perspectives in an ex-
istentially grounded, but institutionally differentiated social ethics. 
 
It is my thesis that communicative ethics is superior to the other mentioned proposals from a phi-
losophical perspective because it is capable of accounting for those proposals through the differen-
tiation of discourses.  But, it is precisely in extension of this point, now seen from a sociological 
point of view, that I also claim that it is exceedingly difficult to discover a positive institutionalisa-
tion of communicative ethics.  It is therefore of paramount importance that the possibility of creat-
ing open institutions be examined with the help of sociology.  Such institutions must make it possi-
ble to question the validity of the different kinds of ethics that are articulated in pragmatic, ethical 
and moral discourses. 
 
It is on the background of this thesis that I discuss the sociological import of the mentioned theo-
ries.  I will here only emphasise some salient points in the discussion of communicative ethics. 
 
The problem as regards communicative ethics is, according to Habermas, that practical reason can 
no longer be understood on the Kantian model of a unity in transcendental consciousness in which a 
moral argument can find its foundation.  Habermas claims that there is no longer a metadiscourse to 
which we might retreat in order to ground our choice between the different discourses.  The prob-
lem, then, is that the differentiation of discourses dissolves the common reference that any one dis-
course makes to a common transcendental reason and, in this way, it dissolves the possibility of 
establishing a criterion against which the validity of any such discourse might be measured.  
Habermas makes it clear that the basic problem of moral philosophy must remain an open question 
and indicates that this question must be left to the philosophy of law.  This is because the unity of 
practical reason can only be enforced in a network of civil relationships, forms of communication 
and practices, in which the conditions for a reasonable collective shaping of the will has won suffi-
cient institutional warrant.  The perspective of moral philosophy, then, is here bound up with the 
sociological perspective through the notion that practical reason cannot stand on its own in modern 
society.  It must be institutionalised in such a way as to secure its warrant through the complex in-
teraction of institutions, through which it can receive its due.  The problem is only one of how this 
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is to be done since it was precisely the transformation of modern society from schism (Hegel) to 
instrumental rationality (Weber) to the differentiation of systems (Luhmann) that laid the founda-
tion for the problem of moral philosophy. 
 
It will be difficult, as far as I can tell, to maintain the idea of positive consensus in moral discourse 
because this would presuppose that moral discourse can be delineated in sociological terms, which 
it cannot.  This, however, does not mean that the question of the validity of the pragmatic, ethical 
and moral discourses founders.  The question of validity is precisely an inquiry into the validity of 
any discourse that imposes itself.  What is important, it seems, is to maintain the force of the ques-
tion of validity and this demands that there be institutions in modern society that allow the question 
of validity to be raised.  This is the perspective that will guide us in what follows.  Taking the chal-
lenges of social ethics as our point of departure we will look at the possibility of discussing, decid-
ing and acting upon these challenges.  It would be too much to maintain the claim that it is possible 
to set out a positive theory of a moral society.  This would demand that it was possible to fall back 
upon practical reason, which is precisely impossible.  On the contrary, this demand raised the prob-
lems of moral philosophy and those of the sociology of morals that we are confronted with in mod-
ern society and which show themselves in the challenges of social ethics.  This is the set of prob-
lems that will be discussed in the following chapter on the relationship between ethics and politics. 
 
 
7.4 Chapter IV:  Ethics and politics 
 
From the beginning, there has been a close connection between ethics and politics in the history of 
political ideas.  It can be found already in the works of Plato and Aristotle and all subsequent work 
in this area has touched upon it.  This is also true of Kant and Hegel, who were discussed in Chapter 
I. 
 
If we return to the different kinds of ethics that are discussed in Chapter III, it would seem that 
communicative ethics is the only proposal that identifies democracy as the relevant form of media-
tion for the challenges of social ethics in civil society.  Those ethical proposals that are oriented by 
existential arguments are only bound by the moral horizon of the individual, which implies that 
there is no possibility of mediation whatsoever.  The phenomenological proposals, too, confine 
themselves to the treatment of immediate phenomena, as is also clearly the case in the work of 
Bauman.  Utilitarian proposals can support mediation but are devoid of any criterion for the deter-
mination of norms.  An ethics based on the theory of social systems is capable of mediation but 
lacks a criterion for the validity of a norm.  The problem with these kinds of ethics, then, is that they 
either tie themselves to immediate phenomenological relationships, rendering any mediation with 
the political dimension impossible, or divest themselves of any criterion for the validity of a given 
norm, while providing means for its mediation.  Thus, only the communicative proposal remains, 
which must be given closer scrutiny. 
 
The crux of the whole of Habermas’ work is the centrality of language in social life.  Language is 
the most general of social institutions in so far as it is construed as constitutive of social life.  Soci-
ety must be understood through language. 
 
Language, then, also provides the key to the mediation that must occur between ethics and politics.  
The ethical and the political become two sides of the same coin for Habermas.  This is an ingenious 
move: one that solves many of the problems that arose in our considerations of Kant and Hegel. 
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The political is, according to Habermas, grounded in the immediate linguistic practice of the public 
sphere.  This conception of the political represents a discourse-theoretical transformation of the 
Kantian conception of the political.  There is an inherent moral dimension in the Kantian conception 
of the political in so far as ethical maxims ought to provide the foundation for common or general 
laws.  But, while Kant ties the moral dimension to the individual’s faculty of reason, a discursive 
ethics assigns the moral dimension in the first place to public discussion, which only thereafter can 
provide the basis for the determination of maxims that can ground common or general laws.  We 
can by this means overcome, in the political domain, the very relationships that imposed themselves 
on Kantian ethics.  What is at stake is the tension between the intelligible and the phenomenal; we 
must vanquish the Kantian monologue and the Kantian problem of providing an ultimate founda-
tion.  The political will be determined as the public discussion of particular relationships that con-
cern implicated parties and of those maxims that ought to ground the laws that will apply to all of 
them.  There is then, an intrinsic connection between the ethical and the political that makes them 
two sides of the same coin.  Ethics cannot survive without the political because any ethical discus-
sion must occur between people in public, and this is precisely what defines the political.  The po-
litical, meanwhile, can only survive as a discussion of those maxims that are to ground common or 
general law, and this is the definition of ethics.  These two definitions share the idea of a public 
sphere in so far as both the ethical and the political demand the possibility of public debate. 
 
Modern society is divided.  This leads to the disintegration of the unity of ethical and political do-
mains.  The public cannot be determined in the singular but must be articulated always in the plural 
form and this creates a manifold of voices that can no longer be gathered into a harmonious sym-
phony, one that would have been based on consensus.  Habermas is himself aware of this fact and 
talks therefore in a number of places of ‘Das Nein-sagen-Können’ (the capacity to negate or deny 
or, more literally, the capacity to say ‘no’), that is, the negative relation that is tantamount to the 
possibility of testing the validity of a claim.  This principle is not suspended by the Hegelian schism 
but makes it more complicated.  Seen from a sociological point of view, or from the point of view 
of political science, it is no longer possible to maintain the idea of consensus as a fundamental rela-
tion in the politics of modern society.  Nor is it essential to do so.  What is essential is that the po-
litical comes to be centred around the many discussions going on in several public spheres and that 
it is here possible, from a philosophical point of view, to test the validity of a claim. 
 
What I am proposing is a negative reading of Kant and Habermas that aims to maintain that crite-
rion of validity which is the core of the political philosophy of Kant as well as Habermas.  In this 
negative reading, this core is not suspended by the reality principle in the form that this principle 
takes in the sociological and political traditions.  The political must, in these traditions, be construed 
as a positive relation that is subordinate to the reality principle in so far as practice is tied to posi-
tive action within the horizon of the reality principle.  But the criterion of validity is subordinate to 
the reality principle; this criterion is what makes it possible to evaluate human action within the 
horizon fixed by the reality principle.  By this means we come to an understanding of the political 
that encompasses both a reality principle in the form of those linguistic practices that operate under 
the conditions we are offered in modern society and a philosophical principle that goes to the ques-
tion of the validity of this practice.  The concept of practice must necessarily be a positive determi-
nation; the concept of validity must necessarily be a negative determination.  There must, then, nec-
essarily be a tension within the political itself between a positive and a negative determination, 
which cannot be sublated, nor is there any need to do so.  It is lethal to construe the political as an 
exclusively positive relation, subordinated to the reality principle and it is an illusion to construe it 
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exclusively as a negative relation, wholly emancipated from the reality principle.  It is necessary 
always to take both dimensions into one’s consideration of the political.  What is at stake, histori-
cally speaking, is the simultaneous adoption of a Kantian and a Hegelian perspective.  This is pre-
cisely what Habermas’ philosophy allows us to do. 
 
It would, however, be impossible to stabilise the political in our political institutions as a moral or-
der if this stabilisation was to be ensured exclusively through immediate public spheres.  Our legal 
relations here take on a decisive importance.  That is what we will look at in the following chapter. 
 
 
7.5 Chapter V.  Ethics, Law and Democracy 
 
The relationship of ethics to politics has been discussed as a question of the legitimacy of the law 
throughout the history of political philosophy. 
 
The notion of natural rights comes to provide the decisive legitimation of the new political theories 
that received articulation in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries by, most notably, Hobbes, 
Locke and Montesquieu.  The notion of natural rights provides these theories with a foundation for 
a critique of the prevailing social order.  The tradition of modern thinking about natural rights is by 
this means given a revolutionary significance in a European context.  European culture also under-
goes a secularisation at this time, one that deprives the notion of natural rights of its theological 
reference.  Politics is given its own independent authority, one which neither demands nor allows 
reference to a divine metaphysical order.  The modern liberal republic is placed on the European 
agenda in this manner, with the Glorious Revolution of 1688 and the French Revolution of 1789 as 
its harbingers. 
 
It is in this context that the political philosophies of Kant and Hegel enter the picture. 
 
It is characteristic of the 20th Century, however, that the whole complex of problems pertaining to 
the relation between ethics and justice that had until then been determined by the notion of natural 
rights is discarded in favour of legal positivism.  This move comes to set the agenda for the whole 
of the philosophy and the sociology of law in the 20th Century. 
 
There are two tendencies in this regard that are taken up for discussion.  One tendency radicalises 
the positivistic way of framing legal problems, adopting a realism and a systems perspective, as, for 
example, in the case of Luhmann’s sociology of law.  The law becomes an autonomous system for 
Luhmann, one that has lost any relation to the legitimacy promised by the notion of natural rights. 
 
The second tendency discusses the traditional relation between law and justice.  We will here con-
centrate our attention on Habermas’ philosophy and sociology of law. 
 
In his major work on the philosophy of law, Faktizität und Geltung, Habermas provides an impres-
sive discussion of the law’s problem of legitimacy.  It is Habermas’ intention to display the relation 
that obtains between law and justice, which constitutes the fundamental problem of the classical 
tradition.  This relation nonetheless founders in modern philosophy of law and no less so in modern 
sociology of law.  The modern principle of law, following Kant, takes as its point of departure the 
individual cosmopolitan (or citizen of the world) and Hegel tries to conceptualize this cosmopolitan 
in terms of a concrete community, centred in the modern state, albeit one which is, according to 
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Hegel, essentially divided.  But this idea is dissolved in the 19th Century’s philosophy and sociology 
of law.  The complexity of social life has grown to such a degree that the systemic reproduction of 
society has become decisive.  We see this in the work of Luhmann.  The state becomes a subsystem 
devoid of the moral force Kant and Hegel attributed to it.  This also strips practical reason of its 
power, according to Habermas.  He believes, however, that the classical way of framing the prob-
lem remains pertinent today and that it should not be seen, as Luhmann does, as merely an outdated 
relic from the past.  Habermas seeks, in other words, to stay in contact with the way the problems 
have been set out in the philosophical tradition, and through which they have been considered from 
Aristotle to Hegel, even if the normative problems that are addressed by this tradition can no longer 
be immediately expressed. 
 
Habermas attempts to apply his theory of communicative action to the task of discovering this me-
diation, and as an extension of this he aims to effect a paradigm shift from practical to communica-
tive reason.  Practical reason, in the Kantian sense, has, as already mentioned, lost its immediate 
significance, which deprives us of any claim to a pregiven authority.  According to Habermas, 
communicative reason has an advantage here because it contains no Kantian categorical imperative, 
indeed, it contains no ‘thou shalt’ at all.  It can transcend itself through criticism; and the normativ-
ity and rationality it presupposes meet in the justification of norms.  Language and communicative 
action is by this means placed at the centre of modern social life.  It is the medium through which 
the relation and the tension between what is actually given and in force, that is, facticity, and the 
validity of what is thus given can be laid out and verified by taking up a reasoned stance in either its 
affirmation or its denial. 
 
Habermas relates this to the discursive sociation of the legal community.  Deliberative politics is 
construed as a reflexively shaped learning process.  This makes ‘the ideal speech community’ a 
thematic yardstick for any deliberative political community. 
 
It can be difficult in practice, however, to determine what is right, as Habermas also reminds us.  It 
can, by contrast, be more pressing to determine what is wrong.  Here, too, Habermas concludes by 
emphasising injustice through ‘the determinate negation’, that is, ‘Das Nein-sagen-Können’ or the 
ability to say no.  The determined negation is not the most prominent feature of Habermas’ theory 
but it does, to my mind, provide us with the key to understanding the whole of that theory.  Accord-
ing to Habermas, the possibility of positive affirmation depends upon the mediation of the possibil-
ity of the determinate negation, the ability to say no.  Habermas brings the whole of his theory to 
bear on this point: to show that norms can be justified positively in modern society.  But the theory 
is ultimately about the possibility of testing the validity of norms. 
 
Ethics can only be developed in a democratic society, based on principles of justice, because it is 
only in such a society that ethics can be a multiplicity of free public spheres, in which freedom of 
speech is a guaranteed right.  It is, in the final instance, the variety of public spheres that must se-
cure ethical discussion in a modern democratic society because this variety offers the possibility of 
bringing critical objections to light.  It is precisely on this that the possibility of testing the validity 
of norms depends.  There will always be interests vested in public discussion.  But the various kinds 
of arguments demanded by the variety of public spheres can bring about discussions that transgress 
the individual points of view, tied to particular interests.  What is essential is that the ethical mani-
fests itself in the conflict between different conceptions of what is right and wrong.  It is precisely 
along these lines of conflict and rupture that ethical problems are set out and articulated in the pub-
lic sphere. 
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This is the case on all levels, whether the level of civil society, the political level, the institutional 
level, the national and the global levels.  It is at the same time important to differentiate the concept 
of agency.  We have thus far worked exclusively with a concept of the person that was abstractly 
determined to be free to reach a decision upon its own values and one that, as citizen, could take 
part in the collective process of deciding upon what common norms might inform the political 
community.  But when this abstract person implicates itself in various social contexts it becomes 
necessary to distinguish between the different social and institutional roles that this involves.  This 
takes us into a discussion that pertains to the challenges of social ethics, in the form in which they 
have been installed in a social field of enormous complexity.  It is to this challenge that we now 
turn. 
 
 
7.6 Chapter VI: The challenge of social ethics 
 
Throughout the foregoing, it has been maintained that the challenges of social ethics are rooted in 
social conflicts over the norms that ought to be enforced in society.  Habermas’ claim that norms 
can be determined only in an open dialogue, in which good reasons can serve as the basis for con-
sensus among potential interested parties, is an extension of this view.  This conception is based, 
again, on possibility of dissent, ‘Das Nein-sagen-Können’.  According to Habermas, it is this ability 
to say no that ultimately marks our freedom.  It the freedom of those who must always be persuaded 
if the use of brute force is to be avoided.  One could here also have cited Adorno’s Negative Dialec-
tics, in which he says that freedom must always be understood as a determinate negation. 
 
The sociological tradition has a tendency to bypass this way of setting out the problem because so-
ciology does not take the dimension of negation into its purview in its attempt to describe social 
institutions.  Sociology is occupied with descriptions of social life as this manifests itself in experi-
ence.  When we examine the sociological theories that have been mentioned here, we find their 
common characteristics to include an emphasis on the role of modern institutions in processes of 
rationalisation, discipline and compulsion.  This is true of the whole tradition, from Marx, through 
Weber, Durkheim, Adorno, Horkheimer, Marcuse, Foucault, Bourdieu, Bauman and on to Haber-
mas.  It is no less characteristic of many of these theories, meanwhile, that they can be read as at-
tempts to discover the possibility of negation.  Granted, they do not express a plenitude of hope in 
this regard.  This, to my mind, is closely linked to the fact that we cannot describe negation in posi-
tive terms, but that it must be approached in potentia, as a possibility, and one which has to be con-
strued in conjunction with conflictual relations and the pursuit of recognition.  The sociological 
perspective will therefore never be adequate to the task of articulating the ethical dimension to the 
extent that it fails to capture the potential inherent in the possibility of negation and objection.  So-
ciology can, however, draw attention to general institutional tendencies as they develop and de-
scribe the formal possibilities for negation and objection as these have been formalised within the 
institutions. 
 
This leads us into the extreme complexity of social life, where endless differentiations are possible.  
In order even to begin to tackle this complexity from a theoretical perspective it will be necessary to 
establish a set of ideal types for society and its institutions.  But not even this construction of ideal 
types can escape the complexity of modern society.  It is therefore necessary to take a principled 
approach; that is, we must make an inquiry into the principle that is to be uncovered in our attempt 
to understand the challenges of social ethics.  This principle is, as already mentioned, the ability to 
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say no or ‘Das Nein-sagen-Können’.    Indeed, this principle is of decisive importance for the way 
in which sociology itself directs its attention upon social phenomena.  The ethical dimension arises, 
in each case, from a conflict between norms.  What is essential is that the ability to say no be under-
stood as constitutive for the positive articulation and setting out of ethical problems.  In social life, 
we find the ethical dimension expressed as the positive articulation of particular norms; but this 
always happens on the background of the possibility of negation.  What remains essential is there-
fore always the possibility of testing positive articulations of norms and the criteria that ground 
these articulations. 
 
Throughout the tradition of political philosophy from Plato and Aristotle, through Kant and Hegel, 
to Rawls and Habermas, it is claimed that ethics must be mediated positively through the political 
domain and legal relationships.  But the sociological tradition denies precisely the possibility of this 
positive mediation.  It is on this background that I have attempted to invert the relation and to ren-
der it negatively.  What I hope to accomplish by this means is to maintain a sense of the essential 
connection between ethical, political and legal dimensions, in accordance with the traditional chal-
lenge of political philosophy.  But the form that this mediation takes will be entirely different from 
that suggested by classical political philosophy.  The complexity of modern society makes any posi-
tive mediation of ethical relations impossible.  Only the negative mediation of the ability to say no 
is now an option.  It is here that the challenges of social ethics appear in conflictual social relations.  
Ethics is ultimately a spontaneous matter and is not amenable to institutionalisation.  Modern soci-
ety can therefore not be stabilised by ethical relationships.  Sociology has, however, also shown that 
society cannot do without ethical discussions.  Society can, as it were, also not be stabilised without 
such discussions.  This would lead to a technically and instrumentally dominated social order, split 
into differentiated autopoeitic systems that mediate social reproduction.  The challenge of social 
ethics is therefore constituted by the problem of creating a deliberative space in which ethical dis-
cussion can be carried on, and this must be accomplished by securing the public discussion of ethi-
cal problems.  In the final analysis, the promotion of our legal relations depends upon setting out 
our problems in political terms. 
 
It is clear, then, that the possibility of raising the social and political order as a problem will be of 
decisive importance.  But here the paradox returns anew.  It is possible to formalise institutions in 
such a way that the formal possibility of framing ethical problems is secured.  But the elucidation of 
ethical problems depends, in the last instance, on social relations of a conflictual kind.  There is 
therefore no way of creating a final social order in modern society.  Social order in modern society 
must always be mediated by public negation.  By this means, the way that philosophy has classi-
cally framed the problem of social order is carried into modern society.  The schism (Entzweiung) 
of modern society, first conceptualised by Hegel, cannot be reconciled in positive terms because 
this would lead to a totalitarian society.  It is, by contrast, important to allow the division to be ex-
pressed in public discussion, in order to secure the possibility of discussing the criteria on which the 
norms that are to be enforced in society are based. 
 
Seen in this perspective, the significance of the public sphere comes to be tied to its plurality, a plu-
rality of public spheres through which the conflicts of modern society can be mediated.  Pluralism 
becomes the basis of a free social order by this means, and the only bulwark against the totalitarian 
tendencies in modern society, which are promoted by the proliferation of autonomous systems in all 
regions of life.  I arrive, then, at an altogether different understanding of social order than the one 
Hegel used as his point of departure, having inherited it from the tradition of classical political phi-
losophy.  Hegel saw the modern schism as a tragic relationship that was to be overcome; for his 
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own part, Hegel hoped to overcome it in the feudal order.  But feudalism is precisely totalitarian in 
nature.  It is not possible to reconcile the divisions of modern society.  It is possible, however, to 
mediate them through the variety discussion supported by the plurality of public spheres.  This does 
not lead us into chaos, as Hegel thought it would.  Social chaos is more likely to result from the 
totalitarian suspension of contradictions in the state and in autonomous systems.  This suspension 
prohibits the public discussion of normative issues.  The tradition of political philosophy displays, 
throughout its existence, a strong will to overcome social divisions because these were seen as the 
root of social chaos, civil war, etc.  Sociology displays the same will or tendency.  This, however, 
shows that it is not finally the schism that is the problem.  The real problem lies in finding a media-
tion of contradictions that is not of a totalitarian kind.  A paradox seems to arise at this point.  It is 
necessary to introduce the possibility of negation if we are to provide a basis upon which to estab-
lish social order in modern society. 
 
In analogy with Habermas’ interest in the question of how communicative action has come to be a 
practical truth for us, we can now ask how this paradoxical understanding of social order has be-
come a practical truth for us.  As far as I can tell, this is owed to the fact that the practical possibility 
that underpins the capacity to say ‘no’ in a plurality of public spheres is forever being shunted aside 
and repressed in the manifold drives of modern society toward positive mediations of the problems 
of social ethics.  This is done in substantive social ideologies, totalitarian regimes and autonomous 
systems.  We face here the same tragic relationship that we have already seen in Weber’s diagnosis 
of the growing dominance of a technical, instrumental rationality in modern society.  But we find 
also a contradiction in this dominance, as can be seen in the subsequent critique of Weber by Hork-
heimer and Adorno.  The enlightenment is endowed with its subtle dialectic.  It works behind our 
backs, forever to confront us with new challenges of social ethics, construed as pressing existential 
problems, that cannot, finally, be repressed or put off because it is becoming increasingly obvious 
that humanity would thereby abandon its hope for the future.  Social order is thus continually con-
fronted with the need to recreate itself afresh as a moral order in modern society. 
 
By this means, I reach the conclusion that negation is the essential element in the transformation of 
social order into moral order.  The problem, however, is that the requisite negation stands opposed 
to the social order.  Only once the negation is mediated in social relations can we begin to talk about 
the passage from social to moral order. 
 
But this is only possible where institutions are so arranged as to be able to contain a denial.  We can 
therefore say that the question of moral order is shifted from being a question of finding a consen-
sus about good reasons to being a question of how to maintain institutions that support the possibil-
ity of a meeting of different reasons, all them good, without any need for consensus about what a 
fundamentally good reason might be. 
 
A political and institutional possibility of this kind has been produced historically with the rise of 
democracy, which can be determined by a constitutional arrangement.  It is characteristic, however, 
that the democratic organisation of the institutions of society can ossify into a formalised social 
order that need not necessarily live up to its name.  The mere affirmation of the given social order 
cannot, therefore, amount to the vitality of such an order.  Only the reasoned objection, only a 
standing challenge to the given social order, one that indicates the possibility of a moral order, can 
bring life and vitality to it.  This insight can then lead us to reflect upon modern society’s need for 
the possibility of criticism.  Only by this means can modernity succeed as a social order, one that 
 24
The Challenge of Social Ethics 
English Summary of Doctoral Thesis Den Samfundsetiske Udfordring 
 
through the reasoned objection indicates the possibility of a moral order as the furthest horizon of 
modern society. 
 
Formalised democracy is not enough.  It is in the first place a thriving discussion and critical mind-
set that can keep modern democratic society alive as a moral order.  This is the challenge of social 
ethics, one that we are continually confronted with in modern society. 
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